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Philip II

King of Macedon

by Joshua Fenton


Isokrates, in his letter to Philip II, exhorts that, "men of high purpose and exceptional gifts ought not to undertake enterprises which any of the common run might carry out with success."1 Philip is a man "of high purpose" who accomplished things that no one of the "common run" was capable of. Even his Athenian opponent, Demosthenes, could not halt subtle signs of respect making their way into his orations.2 These men could not help but admire Philip for his accomplishments. Philip was often passed over in twentieth century scholarship in favor of his more energetic son, Alexander, but recent archeology near Aigai (Vergina), and at other sites within ancient Macedonian territory, have revived interest in the fourth and fifth century kings, Philip in particular.

The work of Manolis Andronicos, in particular, has furthered the field of Macedonian archeology incredibly in the past few decades and inevitably leads to new scholarship on the subject in the areas. With this new interest in Philip, historians are able to get a better look at the genius of his diplomacy, the innovations in his army, his amazing strategic ability and the impossible situation he was faced with and how he overcame it. Philip was the greatest king that Europe had ever seen but not just because of his military prowess. Philip was great because he accomplished something his ancestors could not, he built a united Macedonian kingdom and led it to the most powerful position in the Mediterranean world. Along the way he conquered and united most of the Greek world through diplomacy and superior military strength.

In order to truly understand Philip's accomplishments one must study the history leading up to and following them. He came to power at a horrible point in Macedonian history but proved to be more than successful. He not only united the scattered Macedonian tribes but neutralized their long time enemies. Philip maintained this advantageous position and expanded his kingdom further than anyone would have suspected possible. This brought him into conflict with his more powerful neighbors which he defeated also. Finally he turned his eye to Persia, an ancient enemy that was ripe for the taking. Each of these major accomplishments or points is made up of small, but no less important, actions that Philip took. The sum of all his victories, military and diplomatic, were what allowed his son Alexander to leave and conquer Persia and parts of Arabia and India. Philip built the Macedonian kingdom from the group up. This was a significant accomplishment considering their chaotic history and the impossible situation that he inherited as king.

Many significant changes in the Greek world took place in the transition from the fifth to the fourth centuries. The main changes occurred in the military, the trade routes and the social world. The army that Philip built was by far the greatest thing that the Mediterranean world had ever seen. It is true that the sum was amazing, but the parts were familiar to the leading Greek strategists of the time. Philip's army will be discussed later in more detail, but for this pointed it is important to realize that he learned most of what he knew while captives in Thebes. As Hammond points out, "It was Philip's fortune to spend these years in the city where the two most famous living generals of the Greeks were to be found, where too there was a famous corps of infantry(The Sacred Band), and cavalry far about the Greek average."3 Philips early influences taught him what fourth century armies were capable of. Theben cavalry illustrated the need for mixed or combined forces, The Sacred Band taught him that training and drill were really what determined the victor when it came to infantry and the two generals, Iphicrates and Pammenes, no doubt instructed him in the art of coordinating all the elements of an army. The army that Philip learned to build was far different from the homogeneous phalanx of Greek Hoplites that took the field in the previous century. This is not to say that Philip did not act with genius and inventiveness when he created the Macedonian army, instead I wish to emphasize that he owed a considerable debt to those who had come before. In addition to the changes in military thinking Macedonia faced difficult financial times due in part to shifting trade routes.

The focus of intensive trading began to switch in the early fourth century. Instead of the Balkan areas trading with Greece, they began to turn north.4 Unfortunately for Macedonia this took away her important role as a trade route. The goods were no longer traveling up her rivers into the Balkans from Greece, but rather originated around her and traveled north. This deprived her of much needed revenue. Fourth century Macedonian kings were forced to turn to the interior of their country for their financial needs. As Cawkwell would have us believe this was not a problem because Macedonia was well supplied with mines and timber,5 however I choose to agree with the archeological evidence provided by Hammond and Andronikos which suggest that Macedonia was actually the poorest country in the region and consistently minted the smallest denominations of coins in poor metals and not even those in abundance.6 This lack of hard currency could prove to be a real problem in a world where social pressures were pushing more and more Greeks to become mercenaries.

The third problem of overpopulation in Greek states can be dealt with in several ways. One way, which will be discussed later in relation to Amphipolis, is to ship a city-state's excess population to remote colonies. This was how Asia Minor, or Ionia, was populated by Greeks in the fifth and sixth centuries B.C. and is the better of the two methods. The second method involves large portions of the male population hiring themselves out as mercenaries, or soldiers for hire.7 Isokrates cites these mercenaries as a reason for war with Persia. He believes they will be used up by the army that Philip would lead against Darius III.8 Social pressure had pushed a large population to seek employment from foriegn kings, as Alexander II would find out on his way into the Persian empire. For instance Alexander's greatest obstacle in conquering Persia might have been Memnon of Rhodes, a Greek mercenary general.9 Macedonia and Philip were at a disadvantage to their neighbors, such as Thrace and Illyria, who could afford to hire soldiers while they could not. Later the tables were turned when Philip seized most of the surrounding territory, and their natural resources. Philip would then use mercenaries extensively in various capacities, mainly as garrison troops. In addition to these outside pressures Macedonia faced interal problems that kept her from uniting before Philip II.

Macedonia was anything but one nation at the beginning of the fourth century B.C. It actually contained several monarchies that were allied with the King of the Macedonians. These monarchies were further divided into Upper and Lower Macedonia which served to weaken Macedonia internally. This situation existed up until 358 B.C. when Philip II united all of Macedonia and began bringin the poor herdsmen of upper Macedonia down onto the plain to settle them agriculturally in the fashion of lower Macedonians.10 However, even before and especially during Philip's reign, the Macedonian king controled most, if not all, of the government. He was the greatest among equals. Despite the changes in the Greek world and the disunity that faced Macedonia the country did have one advantage over its neighbors, it was a monarchy. As Preston points out "Macedonia did not have to break through the city-state habit of mind, for it had clung to the institution of monarchy."11

The country was ruled by a monarch with almost supreme control.12 This allowed Philip to execute his plans without interference. The military played a huge role in the country's affairs and it can even be said that Macedonia was a warrior society. The new king must be brought forward by the military and was approved by the Macedonian assembly. Usually it went to the son of the deceased king, if he was a minor the nearest male relative could serve as vizier,13 but this was not a necessity. The kingship was monopolized by the Temenidae family of the Argeadae clan throughout most of the country's history. This provided no measure of stability as the immediate history proceeding Philip II will show. Beginning with the death of Alexander I (c. 452 B.C.) chaos reigned in Macedonia. The army and the Assembly constantly switched between family branches to try and fix the problem but this only created disappointed Macedonians and necessitated a strict law regarding treason. The king was instrumental in the prosecution of these treason cases. Even with this power they were unable to maintain control. In the years up to 393 B.C. there was a period in which they had six kings in six years. By 393 B.C. there was total political chaos. In 368 things began to change for Macedoni when Pelopidas of Thebes stepped in and stopped the civil war taking the young Philip as one of his thirty hostages.14 The marchy allowed Philip the control he needed but it also damaged the country when there is a weak or incompetent king or vizier.

The problems in Macedonia continued and eventually Philip returned to claim the throne. This followed the defeat of Perdikkas III by the Illyrian king, Bardylis. It is for this reason that I do not agree with Macedonian historians who suggest that he was initially serving as vizier for Amyntas IV.15 The historian Justin is the only source for this regency and he is usually unreliable or contradictory. It would be totally out of character for the Macedonian assembly to put a minor on the throne at such a critical moment, especially when Philip, a more than able, and qualified genealogical choice was available. The situation that Perdikkas left was desperate and required immediate action if the country was to avoid total domination from a foriegn power. The young Philip had already been governing some portion of the kingdom so it seems likely that his reputation would make the army's first choice.

Philip was the only real option and I believe he was put forward by the army and accepted by the Assembly for the Macedonian kingship. As king his first actions were characteristically fast and effective. They had to be. He struck at his adjacent enemies while making peace with the countries farther off. All the while he was training the army and trying to unite the Upper and Lower kingdoms and fending off the tradition pretenders to the throne. Philip inherited the kingship but he also had to take the problems facing the fourth century Greek world and the internal problems that hindered Macedonian unity.

The situation in 359 appeared hopeless at first glance. The Army had been nearly destroyed in the recent battle with Bardylis, the Illyrian, Macedonia was probably in horrible shape, Philip faced the prospect of war with two pretenders to the throne, and his adjacent enemies, seeing Macedonia weakened, were ready to pounce. Philip took immediate action in order to save Macedonia.

A common theme throughout the reign of Philip and Alexander, his son, was the constant drilling and training of the army. This did not originate with Philip but he definitely seems to have perfected it. Many scholars wonder how he managed to bring the remains of the army up to a level which could defeat the Greek force landing with Argaeus, the pretender, at Methone in 359. In a matter of months he had recalled the garrison that his predecessor Perdikkas III had sent to Amphipolis and felt he was ready to face 3000 Greek Hoplites, or warriors, in battle. One possibility that most have overlooked is that Philip must have had an elite corps of troops that he hand picked while governing under his brother Perdikkas.16 These troops are overlooked, possibly because of small numbers, but I feel that their contribution gave Philip the edge needed to defeat the Greek Hoplites. He had already trained them in the same fashion that he would now employ with the whole Macedonian army.

There were five immediate problems facing Philip in his first year, 359. The two pretenders to the throne were dealt with promptly. Argaeus was defeated in Philip's first battle commanding the Macedonian army, above, and Kotys of Thrace was bribed to withdraw his support for Pausanias, and possibly had him killed. The Paionians to the north also fell prey to bribery and decided not to invade Macedonia from the north. They were later invaded by Philip in 358 B.C., when their king Agis died and left the kingdom in chaos.17 This left Illyria, Macedonia's greatest early enemy, and Athens, which was very interested in reestablishing herself in the north Aegean.

Bardylis, the Illyrian King, chose not to immediately invade Macedonia follwing his victory over Philip's brother Perdikkas. We can date Philip's marriage to Audata to around this time and it seems likely that she was a daughter of Bardylis.18 This marriage was diplomatic in nature; however we also know that Bardylis was gathering an army at the same time. Philip was attempting to delay Bardylis though his marriage to Audata to not stop him. There are other explanations for why the Illyrian king hesitated excepting fantastic luck on Philip's part.

Bardylis was very old when he defeated Perdikkas and might have lost his urge to wage war.19 He was not planning on such a monumental defeat of his foe and thus was not prepared to venture into the interior of Macedonia. The Illyrians were successful at raids into Macedonian territory but were not well trained for prolonged conflict. Possiblky Bardylis did not want to take on the trouble of conquering a Macedonia that did not seem to be any prize. It was in constant political chaos and was threatened by invasion from all its neighbors except the Chalkidians. Illyrians are said to have measured success in terms boody, not land. Macedonia did not offer much in the way of treasures. Why would Bardylis want to invade? This is the same logic that drove Philip to invade Persia instead of trying to conquer the Greeks. Why would he want to try and rule the poor constantly warring Greeks when he could rule the rich weak satrapies of western Persia? Philip met Bardylis on the field of battle in 358 B.C. and defeated him. This defeat enabled Philip to regain control of Upper Macedonia and begin his policy of unification.

So the question then became how to deal with the Athenians. Philip began his Athenian peace policy immediately. He did two things in the first year of his rule that would set the stage for all future relations with Athens. The first was to withdraw the garrison that his brother Perdikkas had sent to Amphipolis. This went a long way towards winning the favour of the Athenians. They founded the city20 and needed it to take excess population and pay tribute from its incredible mines, which Philip would later seize in 357 B.C.21 Philip's withdraw of the garrison made it easier for Athens to try and reconquer their city which had declared its independence.

In addition to his troop withdraw he let the Athenian prisoners from the battle with the pretender Argaeus return without a ransom. At this early stage the moeny from that ransom would have undoubtedly made it easier to unite the kingdom but in a characteristic show of his diplomatic skill Philip chose to instead encourage goodwill at this point. This definitely was the right thing to do considering he would have had a horrible time if Athens decided to plague him with her navy.

In Philip's first year he was faced with an impossible situation and surmounted it. He not only managed to survive but thrive in the kingship. After these crises were dealt with he continued to implement his military changes and plan his expansion. He constantly took time to reinforce Macedon's defenses and recruit new unites from his allies. It is impossible to know exactly what he planned to do at any given point but it seems that his early goals were the consolidation of his kingdom and the reduction of Macedon's long time enemies. From a strategic standpoint the next set of moves had to be against Thessaly and Thrace. Luckily from Philip Thessaly had just gotten into trouble with Phokis and Pharae in central Greece and saw the need to call on the Macedonian King for support. This gave him the opportunity he needed to secure his southern border and marks the beginning of the second phase of Philip's empire building.

During the second phase of Philip's conquest and empire he had to resolve age old conflicts with Athens and begin to establish a route of invasion into Persia. As mentioned above he began his Athenian policy on a peaceful note but this could not be maintained. Amphipolis had to become Macedonian territory in order to insure Philip's eastward expansion, he had to leave all the countries in central Greece checking each other so he would not have problemsin the rear while campaigning in Persia and he had to respond to uprisings in every country he had thus far conquered. To Philip Athens was the key to controlling Greece. He had to have peace on his terms and alliance.

Philip's contact with central Greece, more specifically Athens and Thebes, resulted in two wars, with great battle each, and two treaties of peace. His early involvement, as mentioned above, came when his ally Thessaly called on him in 353 to aid in her defense against Lykophron of Pherai. The entire first war was an incredibly complicated affair. Pherai by itself was not a problem for Philip but the small country had an ally in the Phokians. This entire conflict, later called the Sacred War, was engineered by Thebes in order to punish Phokis for not responding to its desires. Thebes created some bogus fines for Sparta and Phokis, neither paid and Phokis was forced to seize control of the Delphic oracle and plunder the temple in order to pay for the ensuing war. Thebes got the Amphictyonic council to declare war on Phokis for its treatment of Delphi and the primary member of the league to respond was Thessaly. This is where Philip's involvement begins. According to Cawkwell, Philip saw that the control of Delphi would give him the supreme power in Greece, but I feel that he was much more interested in Thermopylai.22 The war also gave him an excuse to move aggressively towards Athens.

During the early stages of the war Philip was trying to increase his power to Thessaly. He was made archon23 of Thessaly and given supreme military control. The war lasted ten years but Philip was unable to make it to Phokis' ally Athens because of the pass at Thermopylai. He decimated the Phokian army at the battle of Crokus Plain, but was unable to make it through the famous pass that could easily be defended by a samll garrison. This battle marked the official intervention of Philip in the Sacred War and insured that he would have total control over Thessaly. Philip left the war to itself for six years while he sought to reduce Thrace. Thessaly got him into the Sacred War but he was unable to seize the pass that he needed to insure peace with Athens. Despite what Philip seems to have wanted, war with Athens was quickly becoming the sole option.

Having reached the southern limit of his advance, at Thermophylai, in 352 he turned north and began to reduce Thrace in order to expand the eastern border of Macedonia. Philip was now on call to protect Thessaly, because he was their archon, and in 346 he had another chance at the Thermopylai pass. Phokis was back in power and considerably weaker, having used all the Delphic treasure for their war, and acccording to Cawkwell Philip bribed the Phokians to let him through the pass.24 War with Athens was inevitable even though he had continually tried to make peace with them.25 They wanted Amphipolis back from Philip but he could not give it. Athens was trying to curb Philip's power in the north by supporting Thrace and Chalkidike but his army was too fast and successful for them to have any influence this late in the game.

Philip overcame the defense at Thermopylai through bribery but he also engineered a brillian diplomatic trap for the Athenians. While Philip was waiting to sign the Peace of Philocrates he divided his forces and sent half to Thermopylai. Athenians thought they had the upper hand because Philip was unable to breach the pass but he held the Athenians back with one half of his forces while the other half marched around in Thermopylai. When they saw that he was in a position to strike into the Peloponnese it was too late for them to send reinforcements. Peace between the combatants of The Sacred War was now inevitable but Philip's hopes for an alliance with Athens, so necessary for his plans, would be disappointed by Demosthenes.26 Everything was going as planned for Philip but Demosthenes decided to make an issue of the prisoners captured when Philip destroyed Chalkidike. He demanded that the Macedonian king release them before the date he had set and when Philip refused he lost enough credibility to give Demosthenes a chance to cripple his hopes for alliance. The first war with Athens was over, the major battle being Crokus Plain, and concluded with the Peace of Philocrates. The poor Phokians were all but destroyed by Thebes' political maneuverings and Philip was now the champion of Delphi for ending the desecration. The next time Philip went into Greece to give battle Athens would not fare so well.

Demosthenes had foiled Philip's planes for a Pan-Hellenic alliance. This was probably his entire reason for continuing the Sacred War after he had secured control of Thessaly. He now turned his attention to his new Thrakian and Chalkidian territories granting much of the land to Macedonian soldiers. This was one of the unique changes Philip made in the military. According to J.R. Ellis, he allowed the common soldier to advance through the ranks possibly even attaining a cavalry position previously reserved for landed aristocracy. So it was theoretically possible that one could begin as a soldier in the phalanx and work one's way to the point where Philip would grant land due to performance in battle.27 This was unheard of at the time and probably is responsible for much of the Macedonian nationalism that Philip required to unite the country. He drew on these new areas for more soldiers but he also used the conquered land to reward his proven troops. Having taken care of these newly conquered areas he was once again called into conflict with Greece.

In between excursions in to Greece, Philip continually battled to extend his eastern frontier. This expansion eventually had to reach the Cersonese where Athens unfortunately had a great deal of interest. The city-state's population required large crops of grain from the Black Sea area and these had to sail by Byzantium and Perinthos. These two cities happened to be under seige by Philip in 340. Philip seizes the corn fleets and war with Athens ensues. Athens was supporting the cities against Philip but it could be that he wanted to send them a message. They had been raiding all along the Thrakian coast with their fleet commanded by Chares. Philip was undoubtedly concerned about their potential involvement in this delicate rear area. His seiges were unsuccessful and he was called to Greece again to settle war for the Amphictyonic League which Demosthenes had cooked up.28 Philip knew that by defeating Athens he would also defeat Byzantium. He entered the Peloponnese with the dual purpose of one, to reduce Athens and gain their alliance and two, to settle conditions with the Amphictyonic council to Thebes and Athens could not use it to stir up trouble while he was in Persia.

Philip in characteristic style moved his army faster than the Greeks anticipated and prepared to give battle near Chaironeia on August 22, 338 B.C. They could not stop him at Thermopylai because he was too fast and were forced to give battle. This battle would decide whether Philip could safely campaign in Persia. Both armies took field and Macedonia emerged victorious. Chaironeia is the best example we have of Philip's generalship. He exhibits his usual strategy of engagement, a holding action with the Phalanx while using his mobile cavalry to break the enemy's line. With the defeat of the Greeks on the field of battle there was no real option but peace with alliance. This was exactly what Philip needed to secure Macedonia against having to fight a war while he was away campaigning in Persia.

Demosthenes again tried to foil Philip's plans for a common peace and alliance but this time he was unable to pull it off. The Grecian orator was a thorn in the side of Philip, and was always opposed to Isokrates' and Aeschines' peace plans. After making peace with Athens he moved on to create the League of Corinth and name himself head of all its armies. Having done this he was ready to turn his attention towards Persia. It is impossible to know whether Philip had intended to strike at the weak Persian satrapies from the beginning or if he was persuaded by Isokrates. He definitely had detailed information from Parmennes, an old friend and possible lover, about Ionia and knew that he could defeat the armies that Persia was fielding. Probably it was a combination of both, but credit should be given to Isokrates with caution.

At this point Philip's army was perfect. He had trained his soldiers and engineers until they were the best at what they did. He introduced the sarrisa which was longer than the usual pike. In order to increase the density of his Phalanx, he decreased the armour that the soldiers wore. This allowed them to stand closer together and move more efficiently. He also moved the shield to a shoulder strap which enabled them to use both hands for the sarissa. The Phalanx and the Companion Cavalry were taught to move in a wedge formation for maximum shock impact and ease of control. The unit leader could take the peak position in the wedge and direct the rest simply simply by changing direction. Philip created an important place in his army for light armed foot soldiers and cavalry. He used their nobility to take advantage of battlefield opportunties, over retreats and for quick pursuit.

In addition to all these improvements, and those mentioned above, he kept the army in the field year round through the use of selective conscription. This allowed him to operate when the north winds kept Athen's fleet landlocked. Philip had created "an army which was perhpas the most powerful military force constructed before the coming of gunpowder."29 His son Alexander would show us the true dedication and training the army received by putting it to the ultimate test in Persia. One aspect of Philip's innovations in the army is often overlooked.

The command structure of Philip's army was probably improved along wtih the basic structure. At the battle of Gaugamela (Tell Gomel), Parmenio was able to send word to Alexander, who had advanced too far, when he was in trouble.30 This quick communication in a chaotic battle takes training. As mentioned above the average soldier could advance through the ranks and eventually gain a command. Philip seemed to have paid particular attention to the generals he used. In a quote from Plutarch, Philip says "the Athenians manage to dig up ten generals every year; I only discovered on in my life-Parmenio."31 In Thrace Philip was forced to continually divide his force because of the mountainous terrain. This definitely requires great command in order to be successful because small contingents would have to operate independently for extended periods of time. Philip spent a great deal of time training his regular soldiers, so it follows that he would also pay considerable attention to the training of his officers. He did after all establish the Royal Pages which were designed specifically to train noble's sons for future positions of command.32 Taking into account all of these things, it seems likely that Philip paid attention to improving his command structure.

Such was the condition of the army that Philip II left behind when he was brutally stabbed to death by one of his bodyguards, Pausanias, during the spring of 336 B.C. It seems likely to me that Peter Green is correct in assigning some of the blame to Alexander and Olympias. The timing was far too convenient and they had recently slighted by Philip, because of the difficulties surrounding his marriage to Kleopatra. However, the fact that the murderrer was killed on the spot does nothing for the hypothesis due to the fact that it was standard judicial practice in Macedon. Pausanias was allegedly seeking revenge against Philip for not intervening when he was abused by one of Philip's commanders. As Green says "though Pausanias did, in the event, kill him for personal motives, he is unlikely to have done so without active help and encouragement from others."33 There is no doubt in my mind that Alexander and his mother Olympias did play a part in the murder, or patricide, the question is merely to waht extent.34 Philip discovered the inherent defect in a monarchic system that allowed polygamy. There was always the threat of another wife bearing a son and the heir had to take measures to insure his ascension to the throne. Olympias and Alexander had decided that it was not worth the worry of Philip having another heir.

The king was dead and Alexander was poised for his mad dash to the throne. All the accomplishments of the greatest king in Europe were inherited by his son. Later in life even Alexander would praise Philip's accomplishments:

"Philip found you a tribe of impoverished vagabounds, most of you dressed in skins, feeding a few sheep on the hills and fighting, feebly enough, to keep them from your neighbors- Thracians and Triballians and Illyrians. He gave you cloaks to wear instead of skins; he brought you down from the hills into the plains; he taught you to fight on equal terms with the enemy on your borders, until you knew that your safety law not, as once, in your mountain strongholds, but in your own valor...The men of Athens and Thebes, who for years had kept watching for their moment to strike us down, he brought so low...that they who once extracted from us either our money or our obedience, now, in their turn, looked to us as the means of their salvation...he claimed the glory of it not for himself alone, but for the Macedonian people."35


Demosthenes believed that Philip begame great because of Athen's inaction.36 Many people have said that Philip was great for various reasons but I believe it was the sum of his above accomplishments that speak the loudest. He not only took a small country, plagued by internal strife, and transformed it into the most powerful state of the time, which no one else could, but he made innovations in military and social structures that were totally revolutionary. Philip came to power during a dark time in Macedonia's history but was not only able to survive, but to turn the tables on his enemies and dominate them. Alexander's above speece to his men pays tribute to Philip. He left Macedonia in the strongest position of Greece and was preparing to invade Persia. Nothing could stop this man and no tasked seemed to difficult. As Isokrates said, Philip as a man of "high purpose" did not take on the "enterprises which any of the common run might carry out with success," instead he seems to have set for himself the most difficult goals and then achieved them with a valour and brilliant cunning all his own.

End Notes

Works Cited

Arrian. The Campaigns of Alexander. (Translated by Aubrey de Selincourt), Penguin Group. London, England. 1958.

Borza, Eugene N. In the Shadow of Olympus, The Emergence of Macedon. Princeton University Press: Princeton, New Jersey, 1990.

Bradford, Alfred S. Philip II of Macedon. Praeger Publishing: Westport, Connecticut. 1992.

Cawkwell, George. Philip of Macedon. University of California Press: Berkeley, CA. 1991.

Green, Peter. Alexander of Macedon, 356-323 B.C. University of California Press: Berkeley, CA, 1991.

Hammond, N. G. L. A History of Macedonia, Vol II. The Clarendon Press.: Oxford. 1979.

Hammond, N.G.L. The Macedonian State: The Origins, Institutions and History. The Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1989.

Hammond, N.G.L. (Need reference to the ancient atlas)

Hatzopoulos, Miltiades A. Philip of Macedon. Ekdotike Athenon S.A., Athens, 1980.

Isocrates. Isocrates, (translation by George Norlin) The Loeb Library, edited by T. E Page. Harvard University Press: Cambridge, Mass. 1928.

Jaegar, William. Demosthenes: The Origin and Growth of His Policy. Octagon Books, Inc.: New York, NY. 1963.

Lewis, D. M. The Cambridge Ancient History, Vol. IV. The Fourth Century B.C. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, UK. 1994.

Plutarch. The Age of Alexander, (Translated by Ian Scott-Kilvert). Penguin Classics: London, England. 1973.

Preston, Richard A. Men in Arms: A History of Warfare and Its Interrelationships With Western Society. Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc.: Fort Worth, San Francisco, CA. 1991.

Siculus, Diodorus. Diodurus of Sicily. Vols. VII & VIII. (Translated by Charles L. Sherman). The Loeb Classical Library, edited by T.E. Page. Harvard University Press: London, England. 1952 (MCMLII)


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